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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
Sean P. Byrne *
Lauran G. Stimac **
I. INTRODUCTION
Health care reform took center stage on a national level over
the past year. Despite suggestions that medical liability reform
might be incorporated into the federal legislation, in the end, it
was not. Similarly, this year saw few legislative developments at
the state level in medical malpractice law, as the Virginia Gener-
al Assembly focused its energy primarily on the budget shortfall
and other issues. There were, however, several health care legis-
lative and case developments of note which will impact the medi-
cal liability landscape in the coming years. Board of Medicine ac-
tivity and medical malpractice trial results of interest are also
highlighted as we look back at the year's noteworthy legal devel-
opments in Virginia medical malpractice law.
II. NOTEWORTHY OPINIONS FROM THE SUPREME
COURT OF VIRGINIA
The Supreme Court of Virginia evaluated several key issues in
medical malpractice cases in the past year, including qualifica-
tions of expert witnesses in different specialties, permissible evi-
dence at trial from a treating physician, proof of proximate causa-
tion, and waiver of the attorney-client privilege in discovery.,
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1. The Supreme Court of Virginia also decided an important case on the issue of elec-
tion between wrongful death and survival actions. See Centra Health v. Mullins, 277 Va.
319
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
These recent decisions will impact trial practice in Virginia at the
circuit court level and beyond.
A. Jackson v. Qureshi
In January of 2009, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided
Jackson ex rel. Jackson v. Qureshi, a case involving a key aspect
of medical malpractice cases-the qualification of expert wit-
nesses.2 The trial court precluded an expert from testifying be-
cause he had a different area of practice and specialty than the
defendant, and the supreme court reversed, finding that the
record below demonstrated that the witness met the requisite
knowledge and active clinical practice requirements that were
previously addressed in Wright v. Kaye.3 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant physician, Dr. Faiqa A. Qureshi, negligently failed
to admit her infant to the hospital when the infant presented
with signs of respiratory distress and pertussis.4 The plaintiff al-
leged that Dr. Qureshi's failure to admit the infant resulted in the
infant's death.5 During discovery, plaintiff identified a medical
expert to testify on the issue of standard of care. 6 John F. Modlin,
a physician licensed in New Hampshire, was board certified in
pediatrics and pediatric infectious disease.7 The defendants
moved to exclude Dr. Modlin's testimony, arguing that Dr. Modlin
was not qualified to testify against Dr. Qureshi, a pediatric emer-
gency department physician, on the standard of care.8
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to exclude, hold-
ing that Dr. Modlin was not qualified to testify as to the standard
of care applicable to Dr. Qureshi.9 The parties had agreed the tri-
59, 670 S.E.2d 708 (2009). That case is the subject of an article previously published in the
2009 Annual Survey of Virginia Law. See L. Steven Emmert, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Election of Remedies in the Twenty-First Century: Centra Health, Inc. v. Mullins, 44
U. RICH. L. REV. 149 (2009). It is not, therefore, addressed here.
2. Jackson ex rel. Jackson v. Qureshi, 277 Va. 114, 671 S.E.2d 163 (2009).
3. See id. at 117-18, 671 S.E.2d at 164-65 (citing Wright v. Kaye, 267 Va. 510, 518,
593 S.E.2d 307, 311 (2004)).
4. Id., 671 S.E.2d at 165.
5. Id. at 118, 671 S.E.2d at 165.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Jackson, 277 Va. at 120, 671 S.E.2d at 166. The trial court dismissed the case with
prejudice in light of a stipulation reached by the parties that (1) plaintiff would not name a
replacement standard of care expert and (2) plaintiffs representation that "the case would
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al court could base its ruling on Dr. Modlin's deposition testimo-
ny, voir dire testimony in a prior case, and a letter from the De-
partment of Health Professions certifying that Dr. Modlin's cre-
dentials met the requirements for licensure in Virginia.10 The
plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling, arguing that the trial
court abused its discretion by holding that Dr. Modlin was not
qualified to testify as an expert on the standard of care."
The oft litigated issues of what constitutes a "related field of
medicine" and an "active clinical practice" 2 were addressed on
appeal. The supreme court considered the relevant statute, Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-581.20, in deciding this issue." That sta-
tutory section provides, in relevant part:
Any physician ... who is licensed to practice in Virginia shall be
presumed to know the statewide standard of care in the specialty or
field of medicine in which he is qualified and certified. This pre-
sumption shall also apply to any physician who is licensed in some
other state of the United States and meets the educational and ex-
amination requirements for licensure in Virginia. . . . An expert wit-
ness who is familiar with the statewide standard of care shall not
have his testimony excluded on the ground that he does not practice
in this Commonwealth. A witness shall be qualified to testify as an
expert on the standard of care if he demonstrates expert knowledge
of the standards of the defendant's specialty and of what conduct
conforms or fails to conform to those standards and if he has had ac-
tive clinical practice in either the defendant's specialty or a related
field of medicine within one year of the date of the alleged act or
omission forming the basis of the action."
The supreme court found that "[t]he statutory presumption ap-
plied to Dr. Modlin.... Thus, it was presumed that Dr. Modlin
knew the statewide standard of care in his specialties of pedia-
trics and pediatric infectious diseases."16 The court then evaluated
the "knowledge" and "active clinical practice" requirements as
they pertained to Dr. Modlin. The court concluded that Dr. Mod-
lin satisfied the "knowledge" requirement of Virginia Code section
8.01-581.20, reasoning that "the standard of care, as it pertains to
come to a close" if the court found that Dr. Modlin could not testify. Id. at 118, 120-21, 671
S.E.2d at 165-66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. Id. at 118, 671 S.E.2d at 165.
11. Id. at 121, 671 S.E.2d at 166.
12. See, e.g., Sami v. Varn, 260 Va. 280, 535 S.E.2d 172 (2000).
13. Jackson, 277 Va. at 121-22, 671 S.E.2d at 167.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
15. Jackson, 277 Va. at 122, 671 S.E.2d at 167.
3212010]1
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the medical procedure at issue, is the same for a physician with
specialties in pediatrics and pediatric infectious diseases as it is
for a physician with a specialty in pediatric emergency medi-
cine."16
With regard to the "active clinical practice" requirement, which
requires the expert to maintain an "active clinical practice in ei-
ther the defendant's specialty or a related field of medicine within
one year of the date of the alleged act or omission forming the ba-
sis of the action,"'1 the court reasoned that the only relevant med-
ical procedure at issue was whether the infant should have been
admitted to inpatient hospital care.,' "Although Dr. Modlin ad-
mitted that he had not treated a patient presenting with pertus-
sis in an emergency room during the relevant time frame, he tes-
tified that he had treated such patients in the urgent care clinic[,]
which was a 'very similar' clinical setting[ J."19 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that Dr. Modlin met the "active clinical prac-
tice" requirement. 20
The court went on to find that: "The provisions of Code § 8.01-
581.20 do not set a minimum threshold amount of time a physi-
cian must spend in clinical practice to establish that such physi-
cian maintains an 'active clinical practice,' and this Court is not
free to impose one."21 The court thereby rejected the defendant's
argument that the twenty-five to thirty percent of Dr. Modlin's
time spent on direct patient care was insufficient.2 The court ac-
knowledged, however, that "there may be instances when the ex-
pert's clinical practice with regard to the medical procedure at is-
sue is so de minimis that the witness would not meet the 'active
clinical practice' requirement," but Dr. Modlin did not fall to the
level of de minimis practice in this case.22
Based on its findings that Dr. Modlin met the "knowledge" and
"active clinical practice" requirements, the court held that the tri-
16. Id. at 123-24, 671 S.E.2d at 168 (citing Lloyd v. Kime, 275 Va. 98, 109-10, 654
S.E.2d 563, 569-70 (2008); Sami, 260 Va. at 284, 535 S.E.2d at 174).
17. § 8.01-581.20(A).
18. Jackson, 277 Va. at 124, 671 S.E.2d at 169.
19. Id. at 124-25, 671 S.E.2d at 169.
20. Id. at 125, 671 S.E.2d at 169.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
322 [Vol. 45:319
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al court abused its discretion, and it reversed the judgment and
remanded for further proceedings.2 4
B. Graham v. Cook
In September of 2009, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided
Graham v. Cook, a case that required it to evaluate the rules ap-
plicable to the testimony of non-party treating physicians in med-
ical malpractice cases. 25 At issue was the distinction between
statements of a factual nature and those that impart a medical
diagnosis subject to the requirement of Virginia Code section
8.01-399 that diagnoses be stated within a reasonable degree of
medical probability.26 Here, the plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant physician, Dr. Cook, "negligently caused a screw to be placed
into Graham's left hip joint.. . . [This] caused the erosion of the
femoral head that resulted in the hip resurfacing surgery per-
formed by Dr. Gross."27 At trial, Dr. Cook argued that the damage
to plaintiffs hip was caused by avascular necrosis, and he pre-
sented testimony, including deposition testimony where the de-
ponents read from their reports, of three treating health care pro-
viders-Dr. Gross, Dr. Grady, and Dr. Man-to support that
argument.2 1
24. Id. at 126, 671 S.E.2d at 169 (citation omitted).
25. 278 Va. 233, 682 S.E.2d 535 (2009).
26. Id. at 242-43, 682 S.E.2d at 540.
27. Id. at 238, 682 S.E.2d at 537.
28. Id. at 238-42, 682 S.E.2d at 537-39. The portion of Dr. Gross's operative report at
issue reads: "On the femoral side, I did not see any gouging of the femoral head from any
hardware. There was a large area of collapse of the femoral head. [Graham] clearly had
Stage III avascular necrosis as his major problem." Id. at 238, 682 S.E.2d at 537-38 (alter-
ation in original). Plaintiff objected to two portions of Dr. Grady's testimony:
There is flattening and small defects in the upper lateral aspect of the left
femoral head which could be posttraumatic with superimposed osteoarthritis
and subchondral cysts/sclerosis. The possibility of avascular necrosis is not
excluded. . . . Mild lateral sublaxation of the left femoral head and mild-
moderate osteoarthritis in the left hip. Flattening of the superolateral left
femoral head could also be related to prior trauma and degenerative change
but avascular necrosis cannot be excluded.
Id. at 239, 682 S.E.2d at 538. The objectionable portions of Dr. Man's testimony were:
There is a defect in the anterior aspects of the femoral head associated with
cortical irregularities as well as diffuse demineralization involving the fe-
moral head. This raises the suspicion for avascular necrosis. . . . Bony defect
now seen involving the anterior aspect of the femoral head associated with
cortical irregularities and demineralization suggesting fracture and avascular
necrosis.
2010]1 323
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Dr. Gross, the physician who performed the hip resurfacing
surgery, was asked at the beginning of his deposition "to express
only those opinions that he held within a reasonable degree of
medical probability."29 Plaintiff objected, arguing those "state-
ments were inadmissible because they expressed medical opi-
nions that were not stated within a reasonable degree of medical
probability as required by Code § 8.01-399(B)."30 In response, the
defense argued "that the challenged statements merely expressed
Dr. Gross's observations that were made during surgery and were
recorded contemporaneously in his operative report."" Dr. Cook
also argued that because Dr. Gross was instructed at the begin-
ning of his deposition "to express only those opinions that he held
within a reasonable degree of medical probability," this standard
was also satisfied.32 The trial court allowed the contested portion
of Dr. Gross's videotaped deposition testimony to be played to the
jury on the grounds that "the preliminary colloquy satisfied the
requirements of Code § 8.01-399(B)."3 3 The jury entered a verdict
in favor of Dr. Cook, and the plaintiff appealed. 34
Plaintiff contended on appeal that the testimony of Dr. Man
and Dr. Grady was inadmissible because it was not stated to a
reasonable degree of medical probability, and argued "that the
preliminary directive . .. that Dr. Gross state only those opinions
held within a reasonable degree of medical probability [ ] was in-
sufficient to establish a foundation for the admission of [Dr.
Gross's] testimony regarding avascular neurosis and the absence
of femoral head gouging."35 On appeal, the court considered the
relevant provision of Virginia Code section 8.01-399(B), 36 which
provides:
If the physical or mental condition of the patient is at issue in a civil
action, the diagnoses, signs and symptoms, observations, evalua-
tions, histories, or treatment plan of the practitioner, obtained or
formulated as contemporaneously documented during the course of
the practitioner's treatment, together with the facts communicated
Id. at 240, 682 S.E.2d at 538.
29. Id. at 239, 682 S.E.2d at 538.
30. Id. at 238, 682 S.E.2d at 538.
31. Id. at 238-39, 682 S.E.2d at 538.
32. Id. at 239, 682 S.E.2d at 537-38.
33. Id. at 238-39, 682 S.E.2d at 537-38.
34. Id. at 242, 682 S.E.2d at 539-40.
35. Id., 682 S.E.2d at 540.
36. Id. at 243, 682 S.E.2d at 540.
[Vol. 45:319324
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to, or otherwise learned by, such practitioner in connection with such
attendance, examination or treatment shall be disclosed but only in
discovery pursuant to the Rules of Court or through testimony at the
trial of the action.... Only diagnosis offered to a reasonable degree
of medical probability shall be admissible at trial."
Relying on the language of the statute and its prior holdings,
the court upheld the ruling below, concluding that:
[T]he challenged statements made by Dr. Grady and Dr. Man were
factual in nature and related the physicians' impressions and conclu-
sions formed when treating Graham....
The statements by Dr. Grady and Dr. Man did not constitute di-
agnoses, because the statements did not purport to identify specifi-
cally the cause of Graham's health condition based on his signs and
symptoms. Therefore, because the statements of Dr. Grady and Dr.
Man did not impart a diagnosis, the statements were admissible un-
der Code § 8.01-399(B), regardless [ofj whether they were stated
within a reasonable degree of medical probability. 8
The court also concluded that the plaintiff failed to raise and
preserve an objection regarding the "prefatory exchange" at the
beginning of Dr. Gross's deposition.39 This is an issue that is in-
creasingly finding its way into Virginia jurisprudence. Plaintiff
objected on the basis that the testimony was "an opinion, and. . .
not contemporaneously recorded in his notes."40 The court held
the issues raised by the plaintiff on appeal regarding Dr. Gross's
testimony "could have been cured by timely objections at the time
the deposition testimony was taken," so it declined to consider the
merits of his arguments on that issue.41 Similarly, with regard to
plaintiffs objection to Dr. Man's testimony about his habit or rou-
tine, because plaintiff did not specifically object to Dr. Man's tes-
timony on the basis that Code section 8.01-397.1 did not permit
the testimony, plaintiff did not adequately preserve his objection;
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399(B) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
38. Graham, 278 Va. at 244-45, 682 S.E.2d at 541 (internal citations omitted).
39. Id. at 246, 682 S.E.2d at 542.
40. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 246-47, 682 S.E.2d at 542 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 4, R. 4:7(d)(3)(B) (Repl.
Vol. 2010)). The court also ruled that plaintiffs objection to testimony by Dr. Man regard-
ing his habit of checking for hardware when reviewing a CT scan of a patient's joint was
not properly preserved. Id. at 248, 682 S.E.2d at 543. The court also ruled that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting plaintiff from comparing X-rays during his
closing argument when no evidence comparing the evidence was presented at trial. Id. at
250, 682 S.E.2d at 544.
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therefore, he did not raise that issue on appeal.42 The trial court's
judgment for the defendant was affirmed.43
C. Howell v. Sobhan
In September of 2009, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided
Howell v. Sobhan, a case involving the issue of whether the plain-
tiff failed to prove proximate causation.44 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant physician, Dr. Sobhan, negligently performed
abdominal surgery on her by removing more colon than was ne-
cessary and using inappropriate anastomosis techniques.45 The
supreme court overturned the trial court's summary judgment
ruling for the defendants, entered after the trial court sustained a
motion to strike the plaintiffs evidence on the ground of insuffi-
cient evidence of causation.46
In this case, the defendant physician performed a subtotal co-
lectomy, a surgery to remove a portion of the colon, after several
polyps were detected during a colonoscopy." Plaintiff experienced
a leak after the surgery and developed other complications.48 She
alleged that Dr. Sobhan removed too much of her colon and used
an inappropriate anastomosis technique.49 At trial, the plaintiff
presented testimony from two medical experts-Dr. Ludi and Dr.
Hercules. On causation, Dr. Ludi testified that the "plaintiff
would have had a 95 percent probability of returning to a normal
bowel scenario if Dr. Sobhan had performed one of the alternative
surgical procedures Dr. Ludi [suggested]," and that Dr. Sobhan's
procedure left the plaintiff with no chance of returning to nor-
mal.s0 Dr. Ludi also testified that the plaintiff would have chronic
diarrhea and electrolyte abnormalities, and that she would not
42. Id. at 247-48, 682 S.E.2d at 542-43 (citing Nusbaum v. Berlin, 273 Va. 385, 406,
641 S.E.2d 494, 505 (2007)). The court further held that plaintiff "affirmatively aban-
doned" his objection to this testimony at trial. Id. at 248, 682 S.E.2d at 543.
43. Id. at 250, 682 S.E.2d at 544.
44. 278 Va. 278, 280, 682 S.E.2d 938, 939 (2009).
45. Id. at 281, 682 S.E.2d at 940.
46. Id. at 280, 682 S.E.2d at 939-40.
47. Id. at 280-81 & n.1, 682 S.E.2d at 940 & n.1 (citing TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 445, 2101 (20th ed. 2005)).
48. Id. at 281, 682 S.E.2d at 940.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 282, 682 S.E.2d at 941.
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have had a fistula if Dr. Sobhan had performed one of the proce-
dures he suggested.5'
Dr. Hercules similarly testified that Dr. Sobhan's performance
of the procedure "did not [leave the plaintiff with] enough colon
. . . to allow for normal bowel functioning."52 Both experts made
significant concessions on cross-examination, however. Dr. Ludi
acknowledged that fistula and diarrhea are known complications
of colon surgery.53 Defendants argued both could occur in the ab-
sence of negligence.5 4 Dr. Hercules "also admitted that a fistula
could have developed even if Dr. Sobhan had not performed a
subtotal colectomy."6
At the close of the plaintiffs evidence, the defendants moved to
strike, arguing plaintiff had failed to prove proximate causation.56
The trial court denied the defendant's motion.57 At the close of all
of the evidence, the defense renewed its motion to strike.58 The
trial court granted the motion and entered summary judgment
for the defendants, stating: "There can be no dispute that there's
no proximate cause. It's a terrible result. [Howell] did have these
complications, but they were normal complications that just hap-
pened in this case. . . . The jury can't dispute over that."59
On appeal, the supreme court, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, concluded that the plaintiff pre-
sented sufficient evidence on proximate causation, and that
[r]easonable minds could differ about whether Dr. Sobhan's breach of
the standard of care was a proximate cause of Howell's injuries. In
other words, a jury could decide Dr. Sobhan's breach of the standard
of care by performing a surgical procedure that removed nearly all
[of] Howell's colon caused her chronic diarrhea and fistula.o
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 283, 682 S.E.2d at 941.
55. Id. at 282, 682 S.E.2d at 941.
56. Id. at 283, 682 S.E.2d at 941.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (alterations in original).
60. Id. at 284, 682 S.E.2d at 942.
2010] 327
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The circuit court's decision was reversed, and the case was re-
manded for a new trial.61
D. Walton v. Mid-Atlantic Spine Specialists, P.C.
In June of 2010, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Walton
v. Mid-Atlantic Spine Specialists, P. C.62 While Walton was a med-
ical malpractice case, the supreme court analyzed an issue faced
in all types of civil litigation-waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege.63 Although the disclosure of a letter a doctor wrote to his at-
torney regarding potential negligence in his examination of X-
rays was inadvertent, the court held that the doctor waived his
attorney-client privilege by failing to take sufficient precautions
to prevent the inadvertent disclosures.64
The physician defendant in this case, Dr. Moore, wrote a letter
to his counsel in October of 2001 after reviewing X-rays at issue
in a worker's compensation case pursued by Ms. Walton.65 In that
letter, Dr. Moore indicated that when he wrote his report of a
previous X-ray, he may have inadvertently been looking at a prior
X-ray, so he questioned the impression he documented of the X-
ray at issue.66 During discovery in the worker's compensation
case, a subpoena was issued to Mid-Atlantic Spine Specialists,
and a document company-Smart Copy Corporation-collected
and produced the responsive documents.67 Although the letter at
issue was purportedly kept in a separate place from the medical
records, it was copied and produced to the plaintiff.68
When the subsequent medical malpractice case reached the
discovery phase, plaintiff disclosed in her interrogatory answers
that she was in possession of the letter, "which [she] consider[ed]
to be an admission and/or probative of liability."6 9 The defendant
filed a motion for a protective order, seeking to prohibit plaintiff
from using or distributing the letter on the basis of the attorney-
61. Id. at 285, 682 S.E.2d at 942.
62. 280 Va. 113, 694 S.E.2d 545 (2010).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 119, 694 S.E.2d at 547.
68. Id. at 118-19, 694 S.E.2d at 547.
69. Id. at 119, 694 S.E.2d at 547-48.
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client privilege.70 The defense claimed the letter "contain[ed] re-
trospective critical analysis of the case by [Dr. Moore] and his at-
torney."71 After several hearings, the trial court granted the de-
fense motion, "ruling that the letter was privileged, [that it] had
been 'involuntarily' disclosed, and [that] there had been no waiv-
er."72 In its order, the trial court prohibited plaintiff from distri-
buting the letter to anyone, including her experts, and from men-
tioning it at trial.73 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
returned a defense verdict, and the plaintiff appealed.74
On appeal, "the parties [did] not dispute the existence of an at-
torney-client relationship or that the letter was privileged at the
time it was written. The issue presented [was] whether Dr. Moore
waived the privilege attached to the letter."15 The court initially
evaluated the issue of whether the disclosure of the letter was in-
advertent or involuntary; contrary to the trial court, it held the
disclosure was inadvertent, not involuntary, because "[t]here was
no evidence suggesting that the letter was knowingly produced by
someone other than the holder of the privilege through criminal
activity or bad faith .... All of the evidence indicates that the
doctors mistakenly produced the letter, and therefore its disclo-
sure was inadvertent, not involuntary."76 The court further noted
that "[w]hile knowingly, but mistakenly, producing a document
may be an inadvertent disclosure, unknowingly providing access
to a document by failing to implement sufficient precautions to
maintain its confidentiality may also result in an inadvertent dis-
closure."7 7
In this case of inadvertent disclosure, the court applied a multi-
factor test to determine whether the defendant waived the attor-
ney-client privilege. The factors considered were:
70. Id., 694 S.E.2d at 548.
71. Id. (second alteration in original).
72. Id. at 119-21, 694 S.E.2d at 548.
73. Id. at 122, 694 S.E.2d at 549.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 123, 694 S.E.2d at 550.
76. Id. at 125, 694 S.E.2d at 551. The court found support for its holding in a number
of federal cases. See id. at 125-26, 694 S.E.2d at 551 (citing, inter alia, In re Maldonado v.
N.J. ex rel. Admin. Office of the Courts-Prob. Div., 225 F.R.D. 120, 125-26 (D.N.J. 2004);
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dean, 813 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (D. Ariz. 1993); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979)).
77. Id. at 126, 694 S.E.2d at 552.
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(1) the reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent dis-
closures, (2) the time taken to rectify the error, (3) the scope of the
discovery, (4) the extent of the disclosure, and (5) whether the party
asserting the claim of privilege or protection for the communication
has used its unavailability for misleading or otherwise improper or
overreaching purposes in the litigation, making it unfair to allow the
party to invoke confidentiality under the circumstances.7 1
Taking all of these factors into consideration, as well as "any
other factors arising from the posture of the case at bar that have
a material bearing on the reasonableness issues," the court held
the defendant doctors waived the attorney-client privilege.79 Spe-
cifically, the court held that the defendants did not meet the first
criteria because they did not show that they made "sufficient ef-
forts to supervise the Smart Copy employees or to prevent inter-
mingling of the letter with unprivileged, non-confidential docu-
ments."" They did not, therefore, take reasonable precautions to
prevent inadvertent disclosure.81 With regard to the second factor,
the court held that, when the doctors received the plaintiffs in-
terrogatory answer identifying the letter, they should have im-
mediately sought a protective order from the trial court, rather
than waiting a year and a half to do so.8 2 The court also found
that the third and fourth factors weighed in favor of waiver be-
cause the discovery was not expedited or extensive, and the dis-
closure was complete-it was disclosed to the plaintiff and the at-
torney for her employer in the worker's compensation case, and
there was no indication it had been kept confidential by those
parties.8
The fifth and final factor, the interests of justice, merited fur-
ther analysis from the court, but it "also tip[ped] in favor of Wal-
ton."8 The court held that "parties should not be permitted to use
the [attorney-client] privilege as both a shield, preventing the
admission of evidence, and as a sword to mislead the finder of
78. Id. at 127, 694 S.E.2d at 552 (citing, inter alia, Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 390
(D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Desir, 273 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v.
Yerardi, 192 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261, 1263-
64 (8th Cir. 1998)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 128-29, 694 S.E.2d at 553.
81. Id. at 129, 694 S.E.2d at 553.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 130, 694 S.E.2d at 554.
84. Id.
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fact."85 The trial court's ruling on the letter permitted defense
counsel "to engage in questioning that had significant potential to
mislead the jury," and the letter may also have been used for im-
peachment.6 Based on its ruling that the trial court erred and the
privilege was, in fact, waived, the supreme court reversed the
judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for further
proceedings.87
E. Durand v. Richard
Judge Weckstein of the Roanoke City Circuit Court issued an
interesting letter opinion when setting aside a medical malprac-
tice verdict for the defendants after he concluded that the court
had erred in allowing certain medical literature testimony at tri-
al.88 The court found that it was error to allow the defendants to
introduce statements through direct examination of their own ex-
perts that the defendants had not timely designated and provided
to the opposing party pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-
401.1.9
In the defendant's case-in-chief, over objection from the plain-
tiff, the defendant introduced through his expert witness on di-
rect examination statements contained in articles the plaintiff
had designated.90 These articles and statements had not been des-
ignated by the defense in the manner provided for by the relevant
code section.91 During trial, the court ruled "that literature desig-
nated [by any party] can be used [by any party]."92 The court sub-
sequently reconsidered that ruling. After examining the case law,
including Budd v. Punyanitya and May v. Caruso, the court found
that the admission of this evidence was an error.93 Reasoning that
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 131, 694 S.E.2d at 554.
88. Durand v. Richards, 78 Va. Cir. 432, 432 (Cir. Ct. 2009) (Roanoke City).
89. Id. at 432, 434.
90. Id. at 433.
91. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010) (provid-
ing that medical literature testimony "introduced through an expert witness upon direct
examination . . . shall be provided to opposing parties thirty days prior to trial unless oth-
erwise ordered by the court").
92. Durand, 78 Va. Cir. at 433 (alterations in original).
93. Id. at 434 (discussing Budd v. Punyanitya, 273 Va. 583, 643 S.E.2d 180 (2007),
and May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 568 S.E.2d 690 (2002)).
2010] 331
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the error was not harmless, the court granted the plaintiffs post-
trial motion to set aside the jury's verdict and ordered a new trial
on liability and damages.9 4
F. Hawkins v. Johnston Memorial Hospital, Inc.
Hawkins v. Johnston Memorial Hospital, Inc. was a federal
court medical malpractice case where the plaintiff alleged that
while he was a patient recovering from knee surgery at the de-
fendant hospital in 2005, he suffered a serious infection from an
unsanitary shower in his patient room.95 He alleged that the in-
fection caused him to undergo a repeat operation with medical
expense and to suffer continuing pain and discomfort.96 Approx-
imately two weeks before trial, the hospital served an Offer of
Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 on the plain-
tiff, offering to accept judgment against it in the amount of
$150,000.91 The next day, however, defense counsel received
pharmacy records provided by the plaintiff that revealed for the
first time that the plaintiff had received numerous prescriptions
for narcotic pain medications from other doctors.98 In earlier dis-
covery, the plaintiff had specifically denied that he had received
pain medications from other sources.99
When the discovery of the new records came to light, the hos-
pital withdrew their Offer of Judgment and filed a motion in li-
mine "to exclude any claim for pain and suffering or, in the alter-
native, to continue the trial and allow further discovery."0 The
defense argued that this information was "highly significant" to
two "critical issues in the case"-plaintiffs claim of continued
pain and his credibility.10' A few hours before those motions were
to be heard, plaintiff filed a Notice of Acceptance of Offer of
Judgment. 0 2 The court found that the disclosed records were
highly significant to the issues in the case and thus allowed the
94. Id. at 432.
95. No. 1:09CV00024, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44111, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 5, 2010).
96. Id.
97. Id. at *2-3.
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *4.
101. Id. at *5-6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. at *4.
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Offer of Judgment to be withdrawn because of "exceptional fac-
tual situations," namely that "the defendant relied on the plain-
tiffs material misrepresentation about his medical history."103
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The primary focus of the 2010 legislative session of the General
Assembly was passing a balanced biennium budget in the face of
a $4 billion budget shortfall caused by falling revenues. Cutbacks
in health care, education, public safety, and Medicare were all
part of the focus. Although there were no significant legislative
enactments directly addressing medical liability, several substan-
tive health care measures may have an impact on health care
law, and thus future medical malpractice litigation. They are
therefore mentioned here.
A. Lyme Disease
A quintet of bills on Lyme disease were introduced and consi-
dered during the 2010 session.04 Four of the bills were continued
to 2011, and the fifth was tabled. The bills were collectively aimed
at reforming reporting requirements and promoting long-term
antibiotic use as effective treatment for the symptoms of Lyme
disease.0 Various physician experts addressed the House Health,
Welfare and Institutions Committee's subcommittee #1. Although
the offered legislation did not pass, as a result of the subcommit-
tee meeting, Virginia Commissioner of Health Karen Remley dis-
tributed a letter to all health care practitioners in Virginia to in-
crease awareness of Lyme disease.0 6
103. Id. at *4-8 (quoting Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1240 (4th Cir.
1989)).
For a discussion of Antisdel v. Ashby, 217 Va. 42, 688 S.E.2d 163 (2010), in which the
Supreme Court of Virginia clarified the law on the appointment of an administrator of an
estate for purposes of a wrongful death action versus a survivorship action, see John R.
Walk & Andrew P. Sherrod, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Civil Practice and Procedure
183, 191-94 (2010).
104. See H.B. 1288, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010); H.B. 1017, Va. Gen. Assem-
bly (Reg. Sess. 2010); H.B. 897, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010); H.B. 512, Va. Gen.
Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010); H.B. 36, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010).
105. See sources cited supra note 104.
106. See Sarah Bruyn Jones, Virginia Sees Rise in Lyme Disease, ROANOKE TIMES,
June 4, 2010, at Al.
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B. Podiatry
Following Hollingsworth v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., a
Supreme Court of Virginia decision upholding the longstanding
precedent that only a medical doctor (and therefore not a podiatr-
ist) may testify as an expert regarding causation of human physi-
cal injury,10 the General Assembly passed legislation clarifying
the role of podiatrists to include "diagnosis" as part of the practice
of podiatry. 0 s The legislation also mandates that a podiatrist
shall not be permitted to testify as an expert witness against a
doctor or osteopath where such doctor or osteopath is a defendant
in a medical malpractice case or a medical malpractice review
panel proceeding. 109
C. Privileged Communications
Chapter 196 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly amended Virginia
Code section 8.01-581.17 to clarify that the exchange of privileged
health care-related information between committees, boards,
groups, commissions, or other entities that function primarily to
review, evaluate, or make recommendations regarding health
care shall not be a waiver of privilege.110 For example, this lan-
guage would seem to enable hospital "A" to share with hospital
"B" privileged patient safety data without waiving the privilege
attached to that data.
D. Determining Brain Death
Critical care specialists were added to the list of medical spe-
cialists who can make a determination of when a patient is brain
dead." The existing list of specialists already included any duly
107. 279 Va. 360, 368, 689 S.E.2d 651, 656 (2010).
108. Act of Apr. 13, 2010, ch. 725, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
401.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 2010); codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2900 (Supp.
2010)).
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.2:1 (Cum. Supp. 2010).
110. Act of Apr, 7, 2010, ch. 196, 2010 Va. Acts- (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.17(F (Cum. Supp. 2010)); see also § 8.01-581.16 (Cum. Supp. 2010) (estab-
lishing civil immunity for members of or consultants to medical boards or committees).
111. Act of Mar. 8, 2010, ch. 46, 2010 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2972 (Supp. 2010)).
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licensed physician who practiced as a specialist in neurology,
neurosurgery, or electroencephalography.112
E. Immunity
Health care practitioner immunity was expanded to include
services provided at federally qualified health centers designated
by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS"), in ad-
dition to other free clinics that were already covered by Virginia
Code section 54.1-106."1 The immunity provision only applies
when the practitioner acts within the limits of his license, volun-
tarily and without compensation, and provides such services to
the patient without charge.114 The immunity is limited to acts of
simple negligence as opposed to gross negligence or willful mis-
conduct.1"
F. Liens
Chapter 343 of the 2010 Acts of Assembly revised various pro-
visions for recovery of costs for such things as bad checks, damag-
es for loss of use of vehicle, and negligence causing personal in-
jury to account for cost of living and inflation.16 This resulted in
an increase to $2500 (from $2000) per hospital or nursing home,
and $750 (from $500) in the amount of the lien that could be as-
serted for medical bills in a personal injury action."7
G. Student-Athlete Concussions
State Senator Ralph Northam, a pediatric neurologist, intro-
duced Senate Bill 652,11 which was ultimately passed by the
112. § 54.1-2972 (Repl. Vol. 2009).
113. Act of Apr. 10, 2010, ch. 353, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-106 (Supp. 2010)).
114. § 54.1-106(A) (Supp. 2010).
115. Id.
116. Act of Apr. 10, 2010, ch. 353, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified as amended in scattered
sections of VA. CODE ANN.).
117. Id.
118. S.B. 652, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2010); Virginia General Assembly, http://
legis.state.va.us (follow "Senate" hyperlink, then "Senators" hyperlink, then "Northam,
Ralph S.").
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General Assembly.119 This new law requires that the Board of
Education distribute guidelines to each local school division to in-
form and educate coaches, student-athletes, and their parents or
guardians about the nature and risks of concussions.120 The poli-
cies shall become effective on July 1, 2011.121 Local school divi-
sions in turn are required to "develop policies and procedures re-
garding the identification and handling of suspected concussions
in student-athletes."122 This legislation was intended to better
protect student-athletes who are suspected of having a concussion
during play. First, all such athletes must be removed from play
and evaluated. 123 Next, the legislation establishes guidelines out-
lining how and when a student can return to play once he or she
has been diagnosed with a concussion.124 The new law also pro-
vides that written clearance from a licensed health care provider
is required before the student-athlete can return to competition.125
H. Federal Legislation-Medicare Secondary Payer Reporting
Although the concept of Medicare as a secondary payer, and
funding source of last resort, has been present since Medicare's
inception in 1965, recent legislative enactments have added com-
plexity to dealing with medical malpractice cases where medical
bills incurred as a result of the events at issue were paid by Med-
icare. A heightened reporting requirement has put the onus on
professional liability insurance carriers to ensure that Medicare
liens are satisfied when a medical malpractice case is brought to
resolution. Under a revised CMS Section 111 program, liability
and other insurers are required to report all qualifying payments,
which include settlements, judgments, and awards in medical
malpractice cases, made to Medicare beneficiaries.126 Section 111
adds reporting rules to the existing statutory provisions and regu-
119. Act of Apr. 11, 2010, ch. 483, 2010 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
271.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010)).
120. § 22.1-271.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
121. Id. § 22.1-271.5 note (Cum. Supp. 2010).
122. Id. § 22.1-271.5(B) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
123. Id. § 1-271.5(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2010).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(7)-(8) (Supp. II 2008).
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lations, including those requirements which originally arose un-
der the Medicare Secondary Payer Act of 1980.127
Beginning January 1, 2011, each Responsible Reporting Entity
must report to the Coordinator of Benefits Contractor certain in-
formation required by CMS.lis The information to be reported in-
cludes the Total Payment Obligation above the applicable thre-
sholds provided by CMS which occur on or after October 1,
2010.129 Covered entities which fail to comply with the reporting
requirements mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1395y are subject to a fine
in the amount of $1000 per day, per claim, for noncompliance.1o
The complexities of these reporting obligations are beyond the
scope of this survey article, but without question this legislation
will have significant impact on the negotiation and payment of
future medical malpractice claims.
IV. VERDICTS REPORTS
Although verdicts are not formally tracked or reported in a
manner that allows for identification of each medical malpractice
case result, the Virginia Lawyers Weekly publishes attorney-
submitted case reports. It is presumed that most, although cer-
tainly not all, malpractice cases that go to verdict are included in
these reports, which can reflect interesting anecdotal evidence of
trends in malpractice cases.131 Of the twenty-one verdicts in Vir-
127. See Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-173,
tit. I, sec. 111, 121 Stat. 2492, 2497-99 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(B)(7)-(8) (Supp. II
2008)).
128. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MMSEA SECTION III MSP
MANDATORY REPORTING: LIABILITY INSURANCE (INCLUDING SELF-INSURANCE), NO-FAULT
INSURANCE, AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION USER GUIDE 6, 46, 52 (Version 3.1) (July 12,
2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/MandatoryInsRep/Downloads/NGHPUserGuideV3
.1.pdf.
129. Id. at 46.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(7)(B)(i), (b)(8)(E)(i) (Supp. II 2008).
131. Previous years' largest verdict reports from The Virginia Lawyers Weekly noted:
fifteen million-dollar verdicts in 2008 (four of which were medical malpractice cases);
twenty million-dollar verdicts in 2007 (three medical malpractice cases); twenty-nine mil-
lion-dollar verdicts in 2006 (ten medical malpractice cases), and nineteen million-dollar
verdicts in 2005 (nine medical malpractice cases). Virginia's Largest Verdicts of 2008, VA.
LAW. WKLY., http://valawyersweekly.com/virginias-largest-verdicts-of-2008/ (last visited
Oct. 30, 2010); Virginia's Largest Verdicts of 2007, VA. LAW. WKLY., http://valawyersweek
ly.com/virginias-largest-verdicts-of-2007/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2010); Virginia's Largest
Verdicts of 2006, VA. LAW. WKLY. (Jan. 15, 2007), http://valawyersweekly.com/blog/20067/
01/15/largest-verdicts-of-2006/; Virginia's Largest Verdicts of 2005, VA. LAW. WKLY. (Jan.
23, 2006), http://valawyersweekly.com/blog/2006/01/23/largest-verdicts-of-2005-363952/.
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ginia that exceeded $1 million in 2009, seven involved medical
malpractice cases.3 Several examples are noted below.
In Cox v. Gamache, plaintiff alleged negligent failure to timely
diagnose breast cancer.13 Plaintiffs decedent underwent a double
mastectomy, chemotherapy, and radiation, but she died after a
five-year battle with the disease.13 Plaintiffs experts testified
that the patient's chances for a full recovery were between 70%
and 80% at the time defendant allegedly misdiagnosed her, and
that those chances were reduced to 50% by the time she was ac-
curately diagnosed.' 3' A Spotsylvania jury returned a verdict in
the amount of $7.5 million.136 The verdict was reduced to the ap-
plicable medical malpractice cap of $1.6 million.13
In another significant case, plaintiff alleged negligent failure to
diagnose bacterial endocarditis by defendant primary care physi-
cian, resulting in a stroke.13 Plaintiff underwent a root canal for
an abscessed tooth, and he subsequently "developed a fever, fati-
gue, headache, runny nose and sinus pain."'"3 9 His primary care
physician treated him with antibiotics for sinusitis four times
over the next few months.'40 Bacterial endocarditis is a somewhat
rare disease with nonspecific symptoms, but plaintiff alleged that
his failure to respond to repeated courses of antibiotics should
have alerted his physician to the possibility of endocarditis and
prompted him to order intravenous antibiotics, which could have
cured the infection.141 Plaintiff claimed he could no longer work as
an attorney as a result of the brain damage he sustained.142 An
Alexandria jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount
132. Virginia's Largest Verdicts of 2009, VA. LAW. WKLY., http://valawyersweekly.com/
virginias-largest-verdicts-of-2009/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
133. Breast Cancer Metastasizes After Negative Mammogram, VA. MED. L. REP., May
2009, at 11, available at http://valawyersweekly.com/wp-files/pdf/vmlr-may-2009.pdf.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Cox v. Gamache, VA. LAW. WKLY. (Jan. 20, 2010), http://valawyersweekly.com/
blog/2010/01/20/cox-v-gamache/.
138. Alan Cooper, Lawyer-Plaintiff Wins $7M, VA. MED. L. REP., Jan. 2009, at 1, avail-
able at http://valawyersweekly.com/wp-files/pdflvmlr-jan-2009.pdf.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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of $7 million.'14 The verdict was reduced to the applicable medical
malpractice cap of $1.8 million. '
In a case before a Newport News jury, plaintiff alleged negli-
gent failure to diagnose cardiomyopathy by emergency room
("ER") physicians.1' The plaintiff was twenty-six years old and
five months postpartum when she presented to the ER complain-
ing of cough, chest pain, and shortness of breath.146 An X-ray
showed an enlarged heart.14 She was seen two additional times in
the hospital over the next month and a half, and she was treated
for bronchitis and nausea.4 8 On the third visit, an electrocardio-
gram was performed, which was abnormal, and she had swelling
in her legs.149 After being subsequently diagnosed with postpar-
tum cardiomyopathy, she underwent a heart transplant, which
she claimed would not have been necessary if she had been prop-
erly diagnosed.'o The defendant argued that his care was appro-
priate, and that the plaintiff would have needed a transplant
even if the diagnosis had been made correctly.' The jury re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $4 million."s2
The verdict was reduced to the applicable medical malpractice
cap of $1.8 million.'53
In Martin v. Wills, plaintiff alleged negligent failure to timely
diagnose a bowel injury by defendant radiologist.154 Plaintiff was
injured in an automobile accident, and she presented to the ER
approximately eleven hours later complaining of abdominal
pain.'6 A CT scan performed in the ER revealed a relatively mi-
nor abdominal injury, but the delay in diagnosis resulted in the
need for five hospitalizations, ten surgeries, and significant medi-
143. Id.
144. Id. at 10.
145. Alan Cooper, Woman Who Needed Heart Transplant Wins $4M Verdict, VA. MED.
L. REP., July 2009, at 6, available at http://valawyersweekly.com/wp-files/pdf/vmlr-jul-
2009.pdf.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Radiologist Fails to Recognize Bowel Injury, VA. MED. L. REP., May 2009, at 10,
available at http://valawyersweekly.com/wp-files/pdf/vmlr-may-2009.pdf.
155. Id.
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cal bills, all of which she contended could have been avoided if the
radiologist had obtained immediate consultation with a general
surgeon and an exploratory laparotomy.156 The defense contended
that the plaintiffs allergy to iodine complicated his analysis of
the CT scan, and that he was only one member of a multimember
medical team.,' A Prince Edward County jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff in the amount of $3.5 million plus interest."' The
verdict was reduced to the applicable medical malpractice cap of
$1.85 million. 59
In Drake v. Walter, plaintiff alleged that an error by defendant
surgeon during a procedure to treat gastroesophageal reflux
caused bleeding, cardiac complications, and anoxic brain injury.16 0
Plaintiffs experts opined that a Helical tack used during the pro-
cedure punctured a vein in plaintiffs pericardium.161 A Fairfax
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $2.25
million.162 The verdict was reduced to the applicable medical mal-
practice cap of $1.85 million.163
In Williams v. Jones, plaintiff alleged that negligent delivery
by defendant obstetrician when shoulder dystopia was encoun-
tered resulted in brachial/plexus injury and Erb's palsy in her in-
fant.164 Plaintiff alleged the injury was caused by the application
of fundal pressure, rather than suprapubic pressure.65 Defense
experts contended that the injury was caused by contractions, not
negligence by the physician. 66 A Norfolk jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff in the amount of $1.75 million.57 The Supreme
Court of Virginia granted the defendant's petition for appeal on
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Helical Tack Alleged to Cut Vein Inside Pericardium, VA. MED. L. REP., Jan. 2010,
at 7, available at http://valawyersweekly.com/wp-files/pdf/vmlr-jan20lO.pdf.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
164. Negligence by Obstetrician Alleged in Erb's Palsy Case, VA. MED. L. REP., May
2009, at 9, available at http://valawyersweekly.com/wp-files/pdf/vmlr-May-2009.pdf.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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March 15, 2010, oral argument was heard in September of 2010,
and the court's opinion is pending. 16
A Richmond jury returned a $1.07 million verdict for the plain-
tiff in a case arising out of alleged failure to timely diagnose la-
ryngeal cancer, which later spread to plaintiffs lungs.169 Plaintiffs
decedent, a smoker, allegedly complained of ear pain and sore
throat for more than a year, but defendant ear, nose, and throat
specialists failed to perform a fiberoptic exam. 70 The defense con-
tended that a mirror exam alone met the standard of care, and
that detection at that time would not have prevented her death. 7 1
Several noteworthy defense verdicts were also returned in
medical malpractice cases in 2009. In Core v. Anesthesiology De-
fendants, a Fairfax County jury returned a defense verdict in re-
sponse to plaintiffs demand for $10 million in a case involving
the death of a twenty-nine-year-old woman who developed a he-
matoma in her neck after undergoing thyroid surgery.72 The
swelling compromised her airway, causing difficulty breathing, so
an anesthesiologist was called.7 3 He called a surgeon after deter-
mining intubation would be very difficult." When she went into
respiratory arrest, he attempted to intubate her but failed, and
she suffered hypoxic brain injury.17 She was later declared brain
dead, and life support was removed. 7 6 Plaintiff alleged the anes-
thesiologist should not have waited for a surgeon to intubate the
patient, and the defense contended that waiting to attempt intu-
168. Jones v. Williams ex rel Williams, No. 091745 (Va. appeal granted Mar. 15, 2010),
available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/appeals/091 7 45.html. The issues on
appeal are whether "[t]he trial court erred in finding that plaintiff presented competent
corroboration evidence and in denying defendant's motions to strike based on the Dead
Man's Statute issue" and whether "[tihe trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law,
that [the nurse's] testimony was corroborated and in refusing defendant's proposed jury
instruction on the Dead Man's Statute." Id.
169. Lack of Proper Test Said to Result in Death from Cancer, VA. MED. L. REP., Nov.
2009, at 7, available at http://valawyersweekly.com/wp-files/pdf/vmlr-nov-2009.pdf. The
parties' names are confidential. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. Million-Dollar Med-Mal Defense Verdicts of 2009, VA. MED. L. REP., Mar. 2010, at
10, available at http://valawyersweekly.com/wp-files/pdf/vmlr-march-2010.pdf.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Id.
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bation was a reasonable decision because a surgeon could perform
a tracheotomy if needed.1"
In a Fredericksburg City Circuit Court case, the jury returned
a defense verdict in the face of the plaintiffs $4 million demand
in a case involving the death of an eighty-five-year-old woman fol-
lowing gallbladder surgery.78 The surgeon planned to perform the
surgery laparoscopically but, when he encountered dense adhe-
sions, he changed to open surgery. 79 The patient had intermittent
nausea and pain post-operatively, and she became confused and
hypotensive shortly after passage of a nasogastric ("NG") tube to
address a persistent intestinal blockage. 1o She was transferred to
the intensive care unit, where she developed acute respiratory
distress syndrome ("ARDS") and sepsis and died. 81 Plaintiff al-
leged that a perforation during the surgery caused the patient's
post-operative complications and death, but the defense con-
tended that ARDS and death resulted from aspiration when the
NG tube was passed, not from the surgery.18 2
In a confidentially reported case from the Richmond Circuit
Court, a jury returned a defense verdict in a brachial plexus in-
jury case.'83 Plaintiff sought $5 million for permanent disability to
her child, and she alleged that, when she delivered her infant, the
defendant "obstetrician breached the standard of care by not re-
cognizing that the mother was at increased risk for shoulder dys-
tocia" and by not offering her a cesarean section because of her
delivery history, the estimated fetal weight, her obesity, and ges-
tational diabetes.18 4 Plaintiffs expert also testified that the obste-
trician negligently pulled the baby's head, causing injury during
delivery.8 5 The defense contended that there was no increased
risk of dystocia, and that the delivery was handled appropriate-
ly.186
177. Id.
178. Id. The parties' names are confidential. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Another Richmond Circuit Court jury returned a defense ver-
dict in a case involving the death of a sixty-nine-year-old man fol-
lowing surgery for a broken femur.' 7 Plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendants-a surgeon, a hospitalist, and an anesthesiologist-
failed to properly communicate about the patient's pre-operative
vomiting, and that they should have consulted a gastrointestinal
specialist.18 Defense experts testified that the defendants re-
sponded appropriately in light of the information available to
them about the patient.18 9 A factual issue arose regarding the ap-
plication of cricoid pressure by the anesthesiologist, which be-
came a matter for the jury to resolve.o90 The plaintiff sought $3
million, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defen-
dants.19'
V. BOARD OF MEDICINE ACTIVITY
Increasingly over the past few years, Department of Health
Professions ("DHP") investigations seem to follow on the heels of,
or sometimes precede, medical malpractice litigation. DHP, which
is comprised of the various licensing boards, 92 investigates com-
plaints through its Enforcement Division.193 Following the En-
forcement Division's initial investigation, the findings and evi-
dence are summarized in an investigative report, which is sent to
the appropriate board for a probable cause determination.194 If
probable cause is found by the board to investigate further, the
investigation proceeds within the board and may involve an in-
formal factfinding conference or a formal hearing.'95 According to
statistics published by DHP, its three most active boards are the
Board of Medicine, Board of Nurse Aides, and Board of Nursing.19 6
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Va. Dep't of Health Professions, VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.dhp.state.va.us/
(last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
193. Va. Dep't of Health Professions Enforcement Division, VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.
dhp.state.va.us/Enforcement/default.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
194. See Department of Health Professions Enforcement Division, The Disciplinary
Process for Licensed Health Professionals, VIRGINIA.GoV, http://www.dhp.state.va.us/En
forcementlenfDisciplineProcess.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
195. Id.
196. Department of Health Professions Cases Closed, Open and Received, Reports for
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In fiscal year ("FY") 2010, the Board of Medicine received 1680
cases.'97 This is approximately 100 more cases than it received in
FY 2009.198 The same is true for the Board of Nurse Aides, which
received 650 cases this FY,199 as compared to 596 in FY 2009,200
and the Board of Nursing, which has received 1480 cases this
FY,201 an increase of 110 as compared to FY 2009.02 It is unknown
at this time whether these increases in case volume at the Boards
are a result of increasing public awareness of the complaint
process within the DHP, or whether the number of complaints
has increased with the number of licensees. Additionally, the
Boards' increased numbers may be due to their recent efficiency
efforts, which have culminated in 80.7% of cases completed with-
in target time frames for FY 2010, a significant increase from
72.7% in FY 2009.203 Regardless of the reason, however, DHP and
board investigations are increasingly becoming an important as-
pect of the defense of a medical malpractice case.
DHP also publishes statistics regarding the outcome of its
boards' investigations. For the Board of Medicine, in FY 2010,
approximately 16% of cases resulted in a finding of violation, 32%
resulted in a finding of no violation, 50% are undetermined, and
2% resulted in the issuance of a confidential consent agreement.204
Fiscal Year 2010 Fourth Quarter, VIRGINIA.GOv, http://www.dhp.state.va.us/about/stats/
2010Q4/2-4CasesRecdOpenClosed6-30-10.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Department of Health Professions Rate of Compliance with Established Case
Standards, Reports for Fiscal Year 2010 Fourth Quarter, VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.dhp.
state.va.us/about/stats/201OQ4/lCaseStdRpt6-30-10.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
204. Department of Health Professions Charges Showing Category and Disciplinary
Action, Reports for Fiscal Year 2010 First Quarter, VIRGINIA.GOv, http://www.dhp.state.
va.us/about/stats/201OQ1/6ChgCategory&FindXDate9-30-09.pdf (last visited Oct. 30,
2010) [hereinafter First Quarter Charges]; Department of Health Professions Charges
Showing Category and Disciplinary Action, Reports for Fiscal Year 2010 Second Quarter,
VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.dhp.state.va.us/about/stats/201OQ2/6ChgCategoryFindXDatel2
-31-09.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Second Quarter Charges]; Department
of Health Professions Charges Showing Category and Disciplinary Action, Reports for Fis-
cal Year 2010 Third Quarter, VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.dhp.state.va.us/about/stats/2010
Q3/6ChgCategory&FindXDate3-31-10.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Third
Quarter Charges]; Department of Health Professions Charges Showing Category & Discip-
linary Action, Reports for Fiscal Year 2010 Fourth Quarter, VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.
dhp.state.va.us/about/stats/201OQ4/6ChgCategory&FindXDate6-30-10.pdf (last visited
Oct. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Fourth Quarter Charges].
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The statistics for the Board of Nurse Aides are similar, with 33%
of cases ending in findings of violation, 30% ending in findings of
no violation, 34% are undetermined, and 3% resulted in the is-
suance of a confidential consent agreement.05 For the Board of
Nursing, 40% resulted in a finding of violation, 35% resulted in
no violation findings, 23% are undetermined, and 2% ended with
confidential consent agreements. 206 In the cases in which sanc-
tions are issued, those sanctions may include terms and condi-
tions on a provider's license, probation, fine, reprimand and cen-
sure, suspension, or revocation of the provider's license. 20 7
VI. CONCLUSION
The statutory limitation on damages in medical malpractice
cases remains perhaps the most meaningful, and controversial,
"tort reform" measure in this area of Virginia law. The last of the
annual statutory increases in the cap occurred on July 1, 2008,
when the cap was increased to its current level of $2 million.20 8 In
recent years, both sides of the malpractice litigation bar have con-
templated that the General Assembly might revisit or revise the
cap, which could unquestionably be the most significant medical
malpractice liability legal development in recent years. In the
summer of 2009, at the request of Senator Henry Marsh and Del-
egate Dave Albo, the Virginia Trial Lawyers Association and the
Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association were asked to meet
with the goal of defining opportunities for improving Virginia's
medical liability system in a manner that preserves access to care
while providing for fair compensation when appropriate. 20 9
205. First Quarter Charges, supra note 204, at 4; Second Quarter Charges, supra note
204, at 4; Third Quarter Charges, supra note 204, at 4; Fourth Quarter Charges, supra
note 204, at 4.
206. First Quarter Charges, supra note 204, at 6; Second Quarter Charges, supra note
204, at 6; Third Quarter Charges, supra note 204, at 6; Fourth Quarter Charges, supra
note 204, at 6.
207. Department of Health Professions Enforcement Division, supra note 194.
208. See Act of Mar. 14, 2001, ch. 211, 2001 Va. Acts 176 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Supp. 2001)). The Act provided:
The maximum recovery limit of $1.5 million shall increase on July 1, 2000,
and each July 1 thereafter by $50,000 per year; however, the annual increase
on July 1, 2007, and the annual increase on July 1, 2008, shall be $75,000 per
year.. . . The July 1, 2008 increase shall be the final annual increase.
Id.
209. See MED. Soc'Y OF VA., 2009 LEGISLATIVE WRAP-UP 6, available at http://
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In the 2010 session, medical liability legislation was not a sig-
nificant issue. The uncertainty regarding the pending national
health care reform likely provided incentive to maintain the sta-
tus quo in Virginia. Any legislative amendment to the cap would
seem to be an easier political initiative if those stakeholders
reach accord. If not, we can expect a heated legislative battle on
this issue.
www.mav.org/DocumentVault/PDFs/2009-Legislative-Wrap-Up-PDF.aspx (last visited Oct.
30, 2010).
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